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MULTIFACTORAL FREE SPEECH
Alexander Tsesis
ABSTRACT-This Article presents a multifactoral approach to free speech
analysis. Difficult cases present a variety of challenges that require judges
to weigh concerns for the protection of robust dialogue, especially about
public issues, against concerns that sound in common law (such as
reputation), statutory law (such as repose against harassment), and in
constitutional law (such as copyright). Even when speech is implicated, the
Court should aim to resolve other relevant individual and social issues
arising from litigation. Focusing only on free speech categories is likely to
discount substantial, and sometimes compelling, social concerns warranting
reflection, analysis, and application. Examining the breadth of issues
surrounding disputes with communicative components is meant to identify
competing legal factors without rendering the First Amendment all-
inclusive nor, on the flip side, irrelevant to broader ranges of activities.
Coupling theoretical and practical considerations about a case best balances
judicial deliberation. Rather than ad hoc balancing, judges should apply a
rigorous multifactoral test that evaluates whether any relevant
communications are likely to result in constitutional, statutory, or common
law injuries; whether historical or traditional considerations indicate the
speech is protected by the First Amendment; whether there are
countervailing government interests; whether the regulation is tailored
sufficiently for the government to achieve its stated aims; and whether
there are any less restrictive means for achieving underlying policies.
AUTHOR-Raymond & Mary Simon Chair in Constitutional Law and
Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. I am grateful
to Eric Berger, Ashutosh Bhagwat, Andrew Koppelman, Randy Kozel,
Toni Massaro, Helen Norton, and Mary-Rose Papandrea for comments on
earlier drafts.
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INTRODUCTION
Free speech is a meta-right without which representative democracy
would ring hollow. It is invaluable for disseminating public and private
views, spreading information, enriching culture, and associating together.
Deliberation on public policy is essential to secure individual rights and to
advance policies for the common good. Self-expression is linked to a
multiplicity of other constitutional issues such as equal protection, political
participation, and jury trials. For a pluralistic society such as the United
States, whose Constitution provides safeguards for free speech, diverse
perspectives are essential for self-expression, political deliberation, the
quest for knowledge, and the revitalization of law. The exercise of free
speech is also critical for safeguarding a variety of other constitutional
values such as the free exercise of religion and the enjoyment of elective
franchise.
The plain, textual, absolute wording of the First Amendment' cannot
explain the many doctrines dealing with free expression. The function of
free communication is systemic to representative democracy. It carries
penumbral values exceeding the purely linguistic referents of expression:
its constitutional function is related to the individual's right to autonomy
and the public's interest in robust dialogue.2 To paraphrase Justice
Brandeis, speech is tied to our liberties, and courageous deliberation is key
for ascertaining "the secret of happiness."3 The need to safeguard public
1018
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech . .
2 Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REv. 1015, 1020 (2015).
3 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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welfare and safety allows for some restrictions, 4 but not when the
limitations are based on arbitrary judicial holdings or ambiguous legislative
aims unconnected to the pluralistic values of the Constitution.' The
constitutional guarantee of free speech serves political and autonomous
needs, empowering individuals to pursue their unique quests for happiness
and their communal-, civic-, and political-mindedness. 6
In some recent cases, the Court has failed to recognize that the Free
Speech Clause is not a caged off provision but a statement of rights that
draws on-and should be read in light of-the grander scheme of the
Constitution. It provides one of the essential safeguards for the
Constitution's overarching guarantee of liberty, equality, and the general
welfare. Conflicting values are commonly at play in cases implicating the
right to expression in contexts such as campaign financing, terrorist threats,
and digital recordings of official conduct. Judicial evaluation of competing
interests is necessary for the just resolution of these cases, which address
the nation's thorniest problems. These pressing topics involve conflicts of
politicking versus anti-corruption measures, catharsis versus safety, and
transparency versus efficiency. In this Article, I propose a method for
resolving conflicts between these values. Judges should apply a rigorous
multifactoral test, evaluating whether any relevant communications are
likely to result in constitutional, statutory, or common law injuries; whether
historical or traditional considerations indicate the speech is protected by
the First Amendment; whether there are countervailing government
interests; whether the regulation is tailored sufficiently for the government
to achieve its stated aims; and whether there are any less restrictive means
for achieving underlying policies.7 Such an analysis requires a balancing of
private and public interests, an evaluation of pertinent legal texts and
precedents, an examination of whether the law is tailored to the public aim,
and a consideration of alternatives to restricting speech for achieving the
stated goal.
Not all claims about free speech are convincing. Sometimes people
and organizations turn to the First Amendment to advance concerns only
tangentially related to its core values. Isolating analysis to that
constitutional provision can cloud the broader stakes of a claim. The high
4 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667
(1925).
5 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481 (2010).
6 See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("The First
Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also those of the human spirit-a spirit that
demands self-expression.").
7 See infra Part II.
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regard Americans have for the Amendment's principles often lends a
gravitas to advocacy, where a deeper and broader reflection might yield
countervailing concerns of similar or greater magnitude. Fred Schauer has
conceptualized the manipulation of doctrine as "First Amendment
opportunism," by which he means importation of precedent and doctrine
into matters for which they are a poor fit.' The difficulty courts face is
deciding how to give due weight to free speech values while not elevating
them to a point where they eclipse other predicates that should be
scrutinized before rendering a decision.
This Article presents a multifactoral approach to free speech analysis.
Difficult cases present a variety of challenges that require judges to weigh
legitimate concerns for the protection of robust dialogue, especially about
public issues, against concerns that sound in common law (such as
reputation or defamation),9 statutory law (such as repose against
harassment),10 and constitutional law (such as copyright)." Even when
speech is implicated, the Court should aim to resolve other relevant
individual and social factors arising from litigation. Focusing only on free
speech categories is likely to discount substantial, and sometimes
compelling, social concerns warranting reflection, analysis, and
application. Examining the breadth of issues surrounding disputes with
communicative components is meant to identify competing legal factors
without rendering the First Amendment all-inclusive or, on the flip side,
irrelevant to broader ranges of activities. Coupling theoretical and practical
8 See Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH
IN THE MODERN ERA 174 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002). Schauer illustrates First
Amendment opportunism through two examples of cases protecting linguistic activities--one claiming
First Amendment protection for the depiction of animal cruelty and the other violent video games-that
were not historically and traditionally thought to be at the core of the First Amendment. See Frederick
Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613,
1622-23, 1627-28 (2015).
9 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757-61 (1985) (plurality
opinion) (finding that in those defamation cases involving private parties and private matters, the First
Amendment does not require proof of a speaker's actual malice); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 340 (1974) (stating that the "intentional lie. . . '[is] no essential part of any exposition of ideas'
(quoting Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that a showing of actual malice is required in defamation cases
brought by public figures about public matters).
10 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 409-10 (1992) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment) (discussing the constitutional legitimacy of a sexual harassment law similar to Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012)).
1 See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889 (2012) ("Concerning the First Amendment, we
recognized that some restriction on expression is the inherent and intended effect of every grant of
copyright.").
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considerations about a case best balances judicial deliberation. I explore the
contours of this theory and provide concrete examples of its implications.
Part I examines the historical background and penumbral principles of
the First Amendment. The primary focus is on the structural value of free
speech for individuals living in a representative democracy. Part II
discusses the relevance of understanding speech in a broader constitutional
framework. Much of that discussion is doctrinal and intertextual. Part III of
the Article applies my proposed multifactoral analysis to three
contemporary issues: corporate political speech, aggregate political
contributions, and commercial communications. The upshot of the
discussion is that contextual and sophisticated balancing is essential for the
resolution of the difficult questions without the arbitrariness of judicial
bias. Explicit analysis of government authority, conflicting private and
public interests, pertinent constitutional and statutory values, legislative fit
with stated policy aims, and potential alternatives is a transparent method
for evaluating the impartiality of First Amendment decisions.
I. THE DIFFUSE RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH
The Supreme Court has never understood the First Amendment
literally.12 On its face the Amendment applies to Congress alone and
prohibits the making of any law affecting speech. Yet, it is inconceivable
that the executive or judicial branches could repress speech--or for that
matter, religion. 3 Neither has the Court ever understood the First
Amendment to prohibit all forms of regulations affecting
communications. 14
A. The Circumscription of Historical Inquiry
The Supreme Court has recently suggested that the constitutional
meaning of speech must be predicated on its historical and traditional
meaning at the time of the Bill of Rights' ratification. But just as text by
12 For a discussion on the nonliteral interpretation of the First Amendment, see Alexander Tsesis,
Dignity and Speech: The Regulation of Hate Speech in a Democracy, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497,
500 (2009).
13 See, e.g., Agency for Int'l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2332 (2013)
(applying the First Amendment to an executive agency regulation); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713, 714-15 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) (applying the First Amendment to a federal court
injunction).
14 The only absolutist in Supreme Court history was Justice Black. See Edmond Cahn, Justice
Black and First Amendment "'Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549, 553 (1962).
15 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) ("'From 1791 to the present,' however,
the First Amendment has 'permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas,' and
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itself offers a necessary but insufficient picture of First Amendment values,
so too its original meaning will not do for exhausting contemporary
interpretations and constructions. The first step in identifying the relevant
factors of free speech analysis is to take a look at the Amendment's
historical roots.
The Framers of the Constitution and its first ten amendments had a
rudimentary understanding of constitutionally valuable speech. They
regarded free speech in significantly narrower terms than twenty-first
century citizens, scholars, and courts. Nowhere was this clearer than the
Fifth Congress's passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.16 One of
the first Justices of the Supreme Court, while serving as a Circuit Justice,
determined the Sedition Act to be constitutional.17 Even though one of the
two major parties of the day, the Democratic-Republican Party, strongly
opposed the Sedition Act, they agreed with the Federalists that sedition
laws were legitimate." The two parties split about whether the federal or
state governments should enforce them."9 Only in 1964, when, in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court decided that the First Amendment applies
to statements about public speakers on public matters, did the Court
officially recognize the long-presumed invalidity of the Sedition Act.2"
In postcolonial America there were few signs of today's free speech
doctrines. The most auspicious indication of free speech aspirations
approaching contemporary tolerance for dissent was the 1776 Pennsylvania
has never 'include[d] a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations."' (quoting R.A. V., 505 U.S. at
382-83) (alteration in original)).
16 Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798); Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798). One section of the
Sedition Act created a criminal offense against any person who
shall write, print, utter or publish, or shall cause or procure to be written, printed, uttered or
published, or shall knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering or
publishing any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the
United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, or the President of the United
States, with intent to defame the said government, or either house of the said Congress, or the said
President, or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against
them, or either or any of them, the hatred of the good people of the United States, or to stir up
sedition within the United States, or to excite any unlawful combinations therein, for opposing or
resisting any law of the United States, or any act of the President of the United States.
Sedition Act, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
17 United States v. Fries, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 515, 9 F. Cas. 826, 836-40 (C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 5126)
(opinion of Iredell, J.).
18 For a discussion of Jefferson's claim that state governments had the power to suppress libel and
slander even though the federal government lacked the authority to do the same, see SUSAN DUNN,
JEFFERSON'S SECOND REVOLUTION 235 (2004); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, T1E SUPREME COURT'S
CONSTITUTION 170 (1987); Alan J. Farber, Reflections on the Sedition Act of 1798, 62 A.B.A. J. 324,
327 (1976).
19 See Michael P. Downey, The Jeffersonian Myth in Supreme Court Sedition Jurisprudence,
76 WASH. U. L.Q. 683, 695-97 (1998); Farber, supra note 18, at 327.
20 376 U.S. 254, 273-74, 276 (1964).
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Declaration of Rights, first adopted just eleven days after the Continental
Congress passed the Declaration of Independence and thirteen years before
ratification of the Bill of Rights. Pennsylvania created a prototype of the
First Amendment. 21 The following year, on the eighth of July, the Vermont
Constitution set out in relevant part: "That the people have a right to
freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments;
therefore, the freedom of the press ought not to be restrained. '22 Yet the
historical record indicates that for the Framers the guarantee of free speech
did not preclude the legal suppression of dissent. By 1790, Pennsylvania's
updated constitution both protected "one of the invaluable rights of man" to
communicate "thoughts and opinions" and added that each citizen was
"responsible for the abuse of that liberty. ' 23 Another indication of the
postcolonial limited understanding of free speech is demonstrated by
Congressman Matthew Lyon's conviction in 1798 by a Vermont jury under
the Sedition Act; Lyon's constituents were "enraged at the imprisonment"
and "threatened to free him forcibly. 24 Vermonters signed thousands of
petitions in Lyon's support," showing an early propinquity to popular
sovereignty. Lyon was reelected from jail and assumed congressional
responsibilities after serving his sentence.26 Notwithstanding the instructive
value of studying nascent American ideas of free speech, today's expansive
reading of the First Amendment was a product of an extensive parsing of
values catalyzed during the twentieth century by an evaluation of
constitutional values and government practices, not an attempt to be true to
the First Amendment's founding meaning.
Despite the revolutionaries' willingness to prosecute sedition, their
views on speech seem to have been a more sophisticated groping for
broader understanding than the widely accepted view of the eighteenth
century that government was only prohibited from enforcing prior restraints
21 A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the State of Pennsylvania, in MINUTES OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, HELD AT PHILADELPHIA, THE
FIFTEENTH DAY OF JULY, 1776, 25, 26 (1776) [hereinafter MINUTES] ("That the People have a Right to
Freedom of Speech, and of Writing, and Publishing their Sentiments; therefore the Freedom of the Press
ought not to be restrained,"). The Declaration of Rights was then made part of the state's September 28,
1776 constitution. The Constitution of Pennsylvania, in MINUTES, supra, at 58-59.
22 VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 1, cl. 14.
23 PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 7.
24 Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers,
86 HARV. L. REV. 1113,1143 (1973).
25 Alan V. Briceland, The Philadelphia Aurora, the New England Illuminati, and the Election of
1800, 100 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 3, 6 (1976).
26 See MICHAEL LINFIELD, FREEDOM UNDER FIRE 18 (1990); H. JOURNAL, 5th Cong., 3d Sess. 497
(1799).
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on publications. 21 Even before the Revolution, while still trying to drum up
support against perceived British encroachments against colonial rights, the
First Continental Congress proclaimed that freedom of the press consists in
the "advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general" as well as
the "diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of government, its
ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential
promotion of union among them."28 This statement comes as no surprise
because colonists' opposition to the Stamp Act of 1765, which sparked the
concerted intercolonial effort for independence, was a protest against
imposts on newspapers and pamphlets.2 9 Many early Americans regarded
the suppression of truthful papers and articles about public injustices to be
"the most atrocious oppression that can be exercised by Government."3 It
took more than a century of litigation, social development, and political
thought to extend similar protection to false statements in Sullivan.3 As a
positive matter, we do not currently have an originalist First Amendment;
rather than being bogged down by historical understandings, it is more
fruitful to address the values at the heart of modem constitutional
protections for free speech.
B. Penumbral Balance
The persistent values attributed to speech and their evolution into
robust doctrines checking government intrusions are attributable to the
diffuse relevance of expression to the entire constitutional scheme. The
multiple factors of representative democracy connected to speech are better
teased out by analysis than solely by historical description. The substantive
27 In LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960), Levy argued that free press largely
meant merely an "absence of prior restraints," but that claim has been largely discredited. LEONARD W.
LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS, at xi (1985). In fact Levy later admitted that his earlier views
were wrong and too narrow. Id. at x. He came to the new conclusion that "[b]y freedom of the press, the
Framers meant a right to engage in rasping, corrosive, and offensive discussions on all topics of public
interest." LEONARD W, LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 212 (1988). For a
critique of Levy's earlier position and a recognition of his altered thinking, see David A. Anderson, The
Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455, 534-37 (1983); David A. Anderson, Levy vs. Levy,
84 MICH. L. REv. 777, 777-78 (1986) (book review); David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian:
Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REv. 795, 799 (1985)
(book review).
28 Cassius, An Address to the Freemen of the State of South-Carolina 2 (1783) (quoting the
September 5, 1774 Address of the American Congress at Philadelphia).
29 See, e.g., New-York, March 19, Extract of a Letter from Albany, Dated March 10, 1770, NEW-
YORK GAZETTE, Mar. 19, 1770. On the Stamp Act, see DAVID A. COPELAND, DEBATING THE ISSUES IN
COLONIAL NEWSPAPERS: PRIMARY DOCUMENTS ON EVENTS OF THE PERIOD 193 (2000).
30 TUNIS WORTMAN, A TREATISE CONCERNING POLITICAL ENQUIRY, AND THE LIBERTY OF THE
PRESS 252 (The Law Book Exchange, Ltd. 2003) (1800).
31 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
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and procedural functions of government under the Constitution imply the
right of the people to openly express their ideas without viewpoint
censorship.
The national commitment to representative government, deliberation,
and political accountability, which are encompassed by the Guarantee
Clause,"2 becomes meaningless without an enforceable right to freely
communicate political ideas. While self-government is only one aspect of
expression the First Amendment protects, this example is indicative of the
broad-ranging, core interests speech implicates.31 Several jurisprudential
strands demonstrate the First Amendment's place in a larger constitutional
project. These cases empower the people through national guarantees
designed to preserve their right to voice opinions and participate in open
debates. For instance, if any state fails to safeguard republican institutions,
Congress may intervene with legislation to secure political engagement.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is a good example of a measure against
state encroachments.34 The Supreme Court has identified political
participation to be a First Amendment interest,35 but it should go one step
further and connect that factor to the Constitution's other political
protections. Taken to its logical conclusion, the legislative power to
guarantee a representative government3 6 is related to a number of activities
necessary for the general welfare of the polity. Accordingly, Congress can
pass legislation to prosecute violent efforts to undermine elections or
intimidate political dissidents.37 I do not mean here to address the Court's
32 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
33 I am basing my argument on Justice Douglas's famous formulation of the term "penumbra" to
describe unenumerated constitutional protections of human dignity to enjoy First Amendment values,
such as self-expression, association, and political participation. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479,483 (1965).
34 The Court grounded congressional authority to pass the Act pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646 (1966). The Court has not relied on
the Guarantee Clause, which it has unfortunately classified to be non-justiciable, as a source of
congressional authority to pass the Voting Rights Act of 1965. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S.
156, 182 n.17 (1980). For scholarship examining whether the preclearance provision of the Voting
Rights Act could be passed under the Guarantee Clause, see Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to
Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J.
177, 204-06 (2005).
35 See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 194-96 (2010).
36 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) (providing the principle that "as the United
States guarantee to each State a republican government, Congress must necessarily decide what
government is established in the State before it can determine whether it is republican or not"); Texas v.
White, 74 U.S. 700, 730 (1868) (finding the Luther principle applies "with even more propriety, to the
case of a State deprived of all rightful government, by revolutionary violence").
37 See Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1807 (2010).
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conclusion that the Guarantee Clause is nonjusticiable 5 but to point out
that free speech is not solely connected with the First Amendment or
judicial review of state violations, but also the structural guarantees of
representative governance.39 Disputes over speech will, inevitably, raise
concerns extending well beyond doctrine relevant to a communicative case
and controversy. In the area of campaign financing, for example, speech
will often clash with other concerns such as the need to maintain electoral
integrity against corrupt practices-for instance, bribery-that threaten the
electorate's ability to influence public officials.
The assertion that First Amendment safeguards for speech are
connected to other constitutional factors is not new, but is under-analyzed.
In a case dealing with the substantive right of privacy, Griswold v.
Connecticut, the Court recognized that "the First Amendment has a
penumbra" as do other "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights."'40 While
later cases connected those rights with the substantive due process
doctrine,4' the penumbral schema resonates with free speech analysis
because speech is so intrinsic to the Constitution as a whole. Without
vociferous and vehement debate, democratic institutions-judicial,
legislative, or executive-cannot function. Dialogue is at the core of a
variety of First Amendment values: first and foremost politics, autonomy,
and the search for truth. Establishing protections for the expression of ideas
safeguards individuals and empowers the populace. 42 Democracies place
great emphasis on speech because they recognize that its value is not
isolated to only some scenarios-as is the case with other clauses, such as
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments, Confrontation, and Self-Incrimination
Clauses-but to virtually all we do in our social, cultural, and civic lives.
The complexity of First Amendment jurisprudence, as Fred Schauer has
pointed out, is to determine what modes of conduct and communication are
covered by the First Amendment. 43 It should be added that the values of
that Amendment do not stand apart. Their judicial identification requires
38 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964) ("[S]ome questions raised under the Guaranty
Clause are nonjusticiable."); Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42.
39 See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
18-19 (1971).
40 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965).
41 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
42 This synthetic purpose is connected to the dual function of government that I identify in
Alexander Tsesis, Maxim Constitutionalism: Liberal Equality for the Common Good, 91 TEX. L. REV.
1609 (2013).
43 See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (2004).
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not simply looking at the text of the Amendment but also the substantive
and structural factors of representative constitutionalism.
A holistic analysis would require judges adjudicating cases involving
First Amendment issues to undertake historical, doctrinal, normative, and
structural analyses. For example, historical facts make clear that although
ink is not speech, placing a tax on ink and paper used by publishers is a
violation of the First Amendment when the effect of the tax creates a
disproportionate burden on a newspaper.44 The imposition of such a tax
smacked of the Stamp Act of 1765, which the colonists rejected because of
their inability to engage in parliamentary deliberations leading up to its
passage and for its impact on the dissemination of knowledge by
newspapers and printers. 45 Ratifying the First Amendment provided a
normative anchor to a structure of sovereignty, where the state would not
be able to abuse its authority to censure the people.46 And a tax on printed
materials, the Court has found, threatened to chill the press.47
Public access to criminal trials is another area of law derived, not
directly from the First Amendment, but from the fundamental values for
speech that permeate the Constitution. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, the Supreme Court stated this clearly in its constitutional
examination of a state statute requiring judges to exclude the general public
from trials involving charges of sexual offenses against minors.48 A
newspaper brought a challenge, seeking an injunction against a trial judge's
order excluding the press from the courtroom throughout the trial.49 The
Supreme Court found the state failed to meet its strict scrutiny burden of
proof and therefore struck the statute for violating the First Amendment. 0
44 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 593 (1983). See
also Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 704 (1986) (expostulating the Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. holding). The recognition that taxing publications is a "tax on knowledge" has a long
pedigree. Postage on Newspapers, R.I. AMERICAN AND GAZETrE, Dec. 11, 1832.
45 The Stamp Act, N.H. GAZETTE AND HIST. CHRON., May 17, 1765; Philadelphia, December 12,
NEW-LONDON GAZETTE, Dec. 27, 1765.
46 See Alison L. LaCroix, The New Wheel in the Federal Machine: From Sovereignty to
Jurisdiction in the Early Republic, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345, 349 (2007) (discussing how controversies
between colonists and Great Britain during the 1760s and 1770s, such as the one about the Stamp Act,
informed developing constitutional structure).
47 See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. at 585.
48 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
49 Id. at 599.
'0 Id. at 607-08, 610-11. See also Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986)
(explaining that "the trial court must determine whether the situation is such that the rights of the
accused override the qualified First Amendment right of access"); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (plurality opinion) (asserting that the "presumption of openness
inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice").
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As part of its reasoning, the Court examined the implications of a far-
reaching theory of the First Amendment. The Framers of the Constitution,
the majority in Globe Newspaper found, "were concerned with broad
principles" that encompassed "those rights that, while not unambiguously
enumerated in the very terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary
to the enjoyment of other First Amendment rights."5 Access to trials is
connected to the public's right to engage in discussions and deliberations of
governmental functions.52 Thereby, citizens can participate in what we have
found is broadly connected to the Guarantee Clause and, we may add,
certainly the Preamble's mandate for government to be accountable to the
people for maintaining the general welfare: "[T]he First Amendment serves
to ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate in and
contribute to our republican system of self-government."53 The First
Amendment is thus part of a broader constitutional value--engaging in the
workings of government-that requires access to open information.
While the analysis in Globe Newspaper is certainly on target, the
Court might have deepened its reasoning. The majority began by finding
that access to state courtrooms is covered by the First Amendment through
the Fourteenth Amendment's doctrine of incorporation. 4 The Court would
have done even better by beginning with the wider umbrella value shared
by both principles of speech and access. Nothing in the text of the First
Amendment indicates it applies specifically to trials. The Press Clause,
which the Court has neglected as an independent statement of
constitutional protections,55 makes clear that publications enjoy a special
5 457 U.S. at 604.
52 See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2674-75
(2015) (drawing on the Declaration of Independence and Preamble for the premise that the people retain
the "ultimate sovereignty").
53 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604.
14 Id. at 603.
55 Compare Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010) ("We have consistently rejected the
proposition that the institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers."
(quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 691 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)),
with id at 431 n.57 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The text and history [of separate Free Speech and Free
Press Clauses] suggests why one type of corporation, those that are part of the press, might be able to
claim special First Amendment status, and therefore why some kinds of 'identity'-based distinctions
might be permissible after all. Once one accepts that much, the intellectual edifice of the majority
opinion crumbles."). Academic debate on the subject includes: PAUL HORwiTz, FIRST AMENDMENT
INSTITUTIONS 154, 169 (2013) ("An openly institutional treatment of the press would lead to more
doctrinal coherence for the Press Clause and more stability and predictability for the press.... It would
be a mistake to simply characterize blogs as 'a new form of journalism,' and extend to them the same
institutional protections we give the traditional press." (footnote omitted)); Eugene Volokh, Freedom
for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA.
L. REv. 459, 514 (2012) (arguing that "the Court considers the same rules to apply interchangeably
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right, so the First Amendment is no doubt implicated by the case. But there
is more to it. The Court has also recognized that the right to publicly access
criminal trials is connected to the Sixth Amendment right to a "public
trial.5 6 The importance of balancing the values of both amendments is
evident in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, where the Court found that the Sixth
Amendment right is personal and only applies to the defendant. 7 To this
proposition must be added the First Amendment right to access trials
except under certain circumstances where the defendant has a compelling
interest against being prejudiced by public presence or where the post-trial
sealing of the transcript would not provide sufficient protection. 8 The
Court is explicit that what is involved in determining whether the value of
speech should govern in a balancing of constitutional interests: "Closed
proceedings, although not absolutely precluded, must be rare and only for
cause shown that outweighs the value of openness."59
Holistic balancing of free speech and other constitutional factors is not
only relevant to open criminal proceedings but also pertinent to other free
speech-related matters. For example, in a recent case the Court upheld a
statute prohibiting providing material support to foreign terrorist
organizations against a First Amendment challenge.6 Its decision was
partly based on the finding that, "in effectuating its stated intent not to
abridge First Amendment rights Congress has also displayed a careful
balancing of interests in creating limited exceptions to the ban on material
support."61 That is not to say that war powers "remove constitutional
limitations safeguarding essential liberties," including free speech.62 Rather,
balancing requires an assessment of whether government interests to
preserve safety against terrorism are indeed pressing and the means used
are narrowly tailored.
under both the Free Speech Clause and the Free Press Clause"); Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press
Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1048-49 (2011) ("I contend that in order for the Press Clause to have
the independent weight it merits, the courts must give the term 'press' a meaningfully narrow
definition."); Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434, 2443-44 (2014) (stating
that "press speakers are those who fulfill the unique constitutional functions of the press, functions the
Supreme Court has identified--often in dicta-as gathering newsworthy information, disseminating it
to the public, and serving as a check on the government and powerful people").
56 U.S. CONST. amend. V1.
"7 443 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1979).
58 See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510-11 (1984).
'9 Id. at 509.
60 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2010).
61 Id. at 36 (citation omitted).
62 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934)).
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The weighing of private and public factors is also manifest in public
employee cases. Since 1968, the Court has consistently maintained that the
protection of free speech "depends on a careful balance 'between the
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees."' 63
The most recent case decided in this area, Lane v. Franks, relied on this
test. The specific holding vindicated a community college director's right
to give sworn court testimony in a public corruption trial. 64 Writing for the
Court, Justice Sotomayor rigorously scrutinized the type of speech
involved, the speaker, and the government's interest: "A public employee's
sworn testimony is not categorically entitled to First Amendment protection
simply because it is speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern. 65
The need for "[s]worn testimony in judicial proceedings is a quintessential
example of speech as a citizen for a simple reason: Anyone who testifies in
court bears an obligation, to the court and society at large, to tell the
truth."66 But there is further reason, which Justice Sotomayor's opinion did
not mention. In Lane, the individual right to free speech was not all that
was at issue; his obligation as a citizen was also tied to the public interest in
fair trials secured by the Sixth and Seventh Amendments.
II. BALANCING OF INTERESTS
In cases where more than one constitutional value is at stake, each one
that is relevant must be reflected in the resolution of a legal dispute. When
multiple values are implicated (for instance, free speech and privacy or
vigorous political debate and reputation),67 a judge's role and obligation is
to identify each and reason through them-sifting through relevant facts,
arguments, and doctrines-to reach a final decision. In order to limit the
risk that judges will manipulate this contextual adjudication in a manner
63 Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2374 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
64 Id. at 2374-75.
65 Id. at 2380.
66 Id. at 2379.
67 For a discussion of competing speech and other social values, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974). The European Convention on Human Rights accepts a similar balancing of
free speech against other fundamental values. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. Future work on the weighing of
multiple factors would benefit from interpretation of that provision. I have begun such an analysis
elsewhere and intend to return to it in a future book. See Alexander Tsesis, The Right to Erasure:
Privacy, Data Brokers, and the Indefinite Retention of Data, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 433, 484
(2014).
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calculated to reproduce their normative preferences, an anchoring
constitutional mandate tethers decisionmaking to a national ethos.
American constitutionalism-in its structural and substantive features-
manifests a balanced commitment to individual entitlements and competing
public concerns for matters such as order and safety.68 Any law that
discounts either of these features is illegitimate; although there is no set
hierarchy, the resolution of conflicts between individuals, or states and
individuals, must be decided by gradations of scrutiny that reflect the
relative importance of government and private concerns. Strictly speaking,
in a society of equals all cases implicate some set of people who compose
the polity and the operations of offices and institutions. Even a simple
contract case-which includes communication about terms and
expectations but raises no First Amendment issues-involves private
agreement and social norms (defined by common law, statute, or industrial
practices) of offer, consideration, reasonable expectation, and performance.
Like all constitutional principles, free speech is intrinsic to the
synthetic purpose of government, but the Court has never understood it to
be a license for absolute freedom. Resolution of constitutional conflicts
should only be accomplished by contextual analyses of relevant principles
and facts giving rise to the dispute and implicated in its resolution.
Sometimes, as when equal citizens engage in ideological or political
speech, courts favor the freedom of self-expression; in other circumstances,
such as when the government seeks to prohibit terrorist recruitment or
organizing, judges are likely to defer to legislative decisionmakers.69 A
stable foundation-built on constitutional values and stare decisis-is
essential to avoid the ever-present risk that balancing interests will veer off
into arbitrary, results-oriented decisionmaking. The background maxim of
representative government requires the protection of individuals and the
maintenance of the common good. In a pluralistic society, the preferences
68 See Alexander Tsesis, Principled Governance: The American Creed and Congressional
Authority, 41 CONN. L. REV. 679, 682-83 (2009).
69 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448 (2014) (plurality opinion) (asserting that in the
context of campaign financing legislation "the First Amendment safeguards an individual's right to
participate in the public debate through political expression and political association"); Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 25-26 (2010) (distinguishing between "pure political speech,"
which is protected under the First Amendment, and material support for foreign terrorist organizations,
which is not so protected); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (plurality opinion) (asserting
that "lawful political speech [is] at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect").
Terrorist recruitment under the auspices and control of a designated terrorist organization is criminal
conduct rather than protected free expression of ideas. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 28-33
(recognizing the constitutionality of criminally prohibiting persons from providing foreign terrorist
organizations with material support that can be used to fund recruitment efforts). See also Alexander
Tsesis, Terrorist Communications on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2017).
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of individuals cannot always be accommodated and must give way to
broader policy.
Identifying the appropriate standards of review, the pertinent
constitutional issues, and the hierarchies or material interests requires
judges to evaluate whether a case arises from conflicts involving expressive
claims and divergent legal stakes. These scenarios arise in a variety of
cases, such as when the state prohibits the display of symbols historically
linked to terrorist organizations that are communicated with the intent of
threatening others.70 Sometimes the conflict to be resolved is between a
desire for more speech and a public need to allocate available resources,
which is at its most contentious in places explicitly linked to the
dissemination of knowledge, such as libraries.7 At other times, challenges
are brought against a patriotic policy, such as protection of the U.S. flag
against desecration, prohibiting symbolic protest.72 In these types of
complex cases, categorical judicial statements only obfuscate the multiple
factors that should play into fair resolution of controversies.
Free speech issues are particularly complex because they involve so
many strands of private and public concern. Take fraud as an example.
Fraud is a form of communication that is not covered by the First
Amendment because the fraudfeasor violates public and private
confidences.73 The deception of others may well give the speaker an
advantage, thereby promoting his or her liberty, but fair dealings require
government to provide a remedy against misleading business transactions.
It is interesting to note here that the laws against fraud are acutely needed
where the malfeasance itself threatens constitutional institutions. This is
especially the case when it comes to voter fraud, wherein compelling state
concern empowers the exercise of legal authority to preserve democratic
institutions against political corruptions. 74 Recognition of the very real
damage that can result justifies the use of resources to combat such wrongs
70 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380, 391 (1992) (striking a municipal cross
burning ordinance).
71 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869-71 (1982) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that
under certain circumstances a school board can winnow library collections).
72 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 415-18 (1989) (holding unconstitutional a statute
prohibiting flag burning).
73 See Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003). The
Court's recent claim that all content-based regulation should be judged by the strict scrutiny standard,
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015), is belied by criminal sanctions against certain
communications, such as fraud or criminal conspiracy, that can only be defined by reference to their
content.
74 Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam) ("A State indisputably has a compelling
interest in preserving the integrity of its election process." (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent.
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989))).
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as ballot stuffing, absentee ballot abuse, or in-person impersonation. Of
course, the public interest in preventing fraud is not limited to these core
constitutional matters. In commercial speech, the private right to advertise
is protected through the intermediate scrutiny test.75 When advertisement is
true, any government scheme to suppress content, such as advertisement
for legal gambling, will likely fail to overcome the required showing of
substantial interest and narrow tailoring. 76
Whether a court engages in strict or intermediate scrutiny analysis, a
risk remains that a judge will arbitrarily favor the public or private interest.
Precedents, as well as normative tradition and history, provide obvious
sources of guidance. 7  But neither doctrinal categorization nor reference to
past practices is enough by itself. Both can be overruled if they violate
some broader constitutional principle. Even when it comes to
communication there is no definitive way to rely on free speech as a trump:
when strict scrutiny applies, the government must provide a compelling
reason, such as maintaining national security against terrorism, that
outweighs the desire to communicate information. 78 This is easy to
recognize in the hypothetical situation of one party wanting to teach a
terrorist mastermind to create a bomb; in that circumstance the isolation of
speech will not gainsay the need to maintain public safety. Indeed, even if
the proffered instruction involves no conspiracy to commit an attack but is
coordinated with a recognized terrorist organization, the communication
may be actionable. 9 The desire to deliver information and the audience's
wishes to receive it must be balanced against each other. Especially where
the listener is already a member of a terrorist group, it is likely the Court
will find suppression of the communication to be compelling and the least
restrictive means of achieving the goal. Speech is not an absolute but must
be weighed against other pressing civic needs. What remains stable through
this contextual analysis is the public duty to protect the individual for the
common good. At play is a twofold dynamic of private parties living in a
civic society, where they retain their liberties but are legally bound by
social rules and values.
75 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667-68 (2011); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
76 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 510-12 (1996) (plurality opinion).
77 For statements to this effect in diverse areas, see Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc.,
554 U.S. 269, 285 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).
78 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 36 (2010).
79 Id. at 31 (clarifying that "only material support coordinated with or under the direction of a
designated foreign terrorist organization" is actionable).
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In some of its free speech jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has failed
to give adequate consideration to other relevant values. For example in a
recent case, United States v. Alvarez, the Court reviewed the
constitutionality of a statute that prohibited false representation of military
awards, especially the Medal of Honor.80 A plurality of the Court narrowly
characterized Congress's purpose for passing the Act as "creating and
awarding the Medal."'" This was an inadequate reason to suppress speech
on the basis of "sometimes inconvenient principles of the First
Amendment. 8 2 Rejecting the government's claim, Justice Kennedy's
plurality opinion explained that "[w]hen content-based speech regulation is
in question ... exacting scrutiny is required."83 This is contrasted from
"false claims [that] are made to effect a fraud or secure moneys or other
valuable considerations," which the government can restrict without being
subject to First Amendment scrutiny. 4 That conclusion is convincing from
an as-applied basis because the defendant did not seek to defraud the
government but only to elevate his community reputation.85 The opinion is
unsatisfactory, however, because the plurality failed to take seriously all
the values at stake in striking the statute on its face. 86 In the latter posture,
the plurality gave short shrift to the government's argument that false
claims of military honors can be exploited to gain "lucrative contracts and
government benefits."87
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Breyer did take seriously that the
statute was passed to safeguard the integrity of those who had received
medals. There he elaborated a meaty balancing test:
In determining whether a statute violates the First Amendment, this Court has
often found it appropriate to examine the fit between statutory ends and
means. In doing so, it has examined speech-related harms, justifications, and
potential alternatives. In particular, it has taken account of the seriousness of
the speech-related harm the provision will likely cause, the nature and
importance of the provision's countervailing objectives, the extent to which
the provision will tend to achieve those objectives, and whether there are
80 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2542 (2012) (plurality opinion).
81 Id. at 2543.
82 Id.
83 Id.
S4 Id. at 2547.
85 Id. at 2542.
86 The Supreme Court might have upheld the statute on its face while striking it as applied to
Alvarez because he raised both claims alternatively at the trial court level. Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment at 3, United States v. Alvarez, No.
CR 07-1035-ER, (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2007). Both issues had also been preserved at the circuit court
level. United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2010), affd, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
87 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2558 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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other, less restrictive ways of doing so. Ultimately the Court has had to
determine whether the statute works speech-related harm that is out of
proportion to its justifications.88
This test provides extensive guidance for weighing various legal factors of
a case. Inevitably those considerations, especially if we add concerns for
the general welfare to this formulation, require an assessment of multiple
factors along with speech.
At play was the government's obligation to safeguard valuable
resources against fraudulent claims of valor. Professor Kate Stith has
articulated a principle she calls the "Principle of the Public Fisc" providing
that: "All monies of the federal government must be claimed as public
revenues, subject to public control through constitutional processes."89 This
is an unenumerated constitutional directive that government is to act for the
"general Welfare," in the words of the Preamble.9" In Stith's view, the
government has an obligation to protect the public fisc by responsibly
controlling public expenditures. Funds cannot be allocated in violation of
Bill of Rights norms, such as free speech, but public agents must also be
cognizant of Spending Clause values to fund benefits programs in
furtherance of the general welfare and common defense, which is an
enumerated responsibility located in Article I, § 8, cl. 1.91 The Alvarez
Court should have carefully weighed free speech rights against the
system's integrity interests and the general welfare concerns for preserving
the public fisc from false claims to military awards. That was not at issue in
Alvarez, but as a general rule the Court struck a statute that was narrowly
tailored for that legitimate purpose. The outcome of the case may well have
been the same because the statute applied to an overbroad case of
misstatements, but the alternative, multifactoral reasoning would have been
more convincing and made the record more complete. Moreover, the
government's discretion to safeguard public funds would have been left
intact, rendering the opinion an easier sell to the public and of greater value
to lower courts.
Balancing analysis requires identifying competing constitutional
interests; their relative weights, inferred or directly gleaned from doctrine
and history; and a careful consideration of how best to protect the rights of
litigants and the separate interests of the public. The conclusions will
88 Id. at 2551 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
89 Kate Stith, Congress'Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1364 (1988).
90 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
91 See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 152-53 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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remain contestable but will provide guidance to lower courts and enrich
existing doctrine.
In more elaborate terms, with the additional requirement that judges
review how legislation affects socially recognized general welfare rather
than solely government interests, I propose the following framework for
multifactoral analysis: (1) whether the expression at issue is likely to
implicate specific constitutional, statutory, or common law harms; (2)
whether the restriction on speech is based on a historical or traditional
doctrine; (3) whether any government policies benefitting the general
welfare weigh in favor of the regulation; (4) whether the regulation on
speech closely fits the public ends that are sought; and (5) whether there are
any less restrictive alternatives to achieving them.
This five-part test recognizes that speech is a liberty that can conflict
with other constitutionally protected interests. It provides a framework
against both underestimating expression when self-expression or political
statements are involved, and overestimating the value of speech to a point
where even de minimis communication with content trumps weighty
considerations of constitutional values like due process, privacy, or
equality.92 Which values a court should give greater weight in resolving a
dispute will depend on the factual, substantive, and procedural record of
each case.93 Because judges are human, there will often be differing
opinions and appellate review needed for some resolution. A case-by-case
analysis is required to identify relevant private and public concerns.
Despite the pertinence of history and tradition, evolution in law is
inevitable and necessary to meet fresh realities like digital communication.
Legislative and adjudicative mistakes will undoubtedly be made, but
the broad mandate of the Constitution provides the deliberative means of
building on and correcting statutes, regulations, and precedents. As Mark
Rosen has pointed out, the continuation of political communities will
expose the "patterned, predictable harmonizations of competing
commitments.9 4 Our tripartite system of government often relies on broad
judicial powers for defining free speech principles. That is, for instance, the
case with the "most exacting scrutiny" standard for reviewing
communicative conduct such as flag burning95 or the "more demanding"
92 But see Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015) (suggesting all content-based
regulations on speech should be subject to strict scrutiny).
93 See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 50-54 (Julian Rivers trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press Inc. 2002) (1986) (discussing the balancing of principles).
94 Mark D. Rosen, When Are Constitutional Rights Non-Absolute? McCutcheon, Conflicts, and the
Sufficiency Question, 56 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1535, 1586 (2015).
95 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
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than intermediate standard of review for material support for terror
statutes, 96 both of which are flexible enough for judges to evaluate the full
public, private, and constitutional content of the case. Moreover, courts
have proven capable of administering multistep tests, as in the incidental
speech area.97 History and tradition are indeed important factors-for
example, the historical terror associated with burning crosses was critical in
the Court's decision finding it legitimate for a state to pass a criminal
statute "outlaw[ing] cross burnings done with the intent to intimidate."98
Contrary to the Court's recent claim that all content-based regulations
must be subject to strict scrutiny, 99 some regulations, such as antitrust or
criminal solicitation litigation, involve communications that lack
constitutional status precisely because of their content.oo Neither the text of
the First Amendment nor any meta-principle growing out of it permits
monopolistic or criminal agreements, nor does the Constitution prohibit
laws against fraudulent and defamatory content. At other times, two
conflicting constitutional clauses will be involved, as in cases presenting
speech and copyright concerns, which I deal with below. And in other
cases, such as emotive speech, the core purposes of speech-personal
expression, political debate, and information-are likely to weigh on the
side of speakers. For example, the First Amendment shields commercial
actors against an antitrust complaint when they jointly partake in a
publicity campaign designed to influence legislators to favor their sector of
the industry over competitors.' Even when a message might be construed
by the audience to be offensive, government may not silence it to enforce a
"heckler's veto."' 2 The presence of political speech shifts the interest in
favor of speech over the enforcement of laws protecting competition. But
simple labels of expression or content-based legislation do not provide the
needed depth for careful judicial scrutiny.
96 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 8, 28 (2010) (quoting Texas, 491 U.S. at 403).
97 See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
98 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003) (plurality opinion).
99 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015) ("A law that is content based on its face
is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government's benign motive, content-neutral justification,
or lack of 'animus toward the ideas contained' in the regulated speech." (quoting Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,429 (1993))).
1oo See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008) ("Offers to engage in illegal
transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection."); Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization
of that market .... ).
101 See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961).
102 Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 567 (1970); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 133 n.1
(1966) (plurality opinion).
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The most complex cases are those where two constitutional interests
are at stake, such as when resolution is needed between opposing litigants'
claims involving intellectual property and free speech factors. In such
circumstances, courts should not shy away from a full airing, comparing,
and distinguishing of separate strands of doctrines that might indicate
different outcomes and issue-specific levels of scrutiny. Without engaging
in this thorough judicial assessment, courts neglect relevant constitutional
factors. As free speech is protected by the First Amendment, the Copyright
Clause safeguards a wide variety of creative and artistic forms of
expression." 3 In its most recent cases, rather than taking equal account of
both constitutional values, which would require the government to defend
its position based on a heightened level of scrutiny, the Court separated the
two forms of analyses. In Golan v. Holder, the majority upheld the
constitutionality of Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.' °4
Instead of invoking the pure-speech strict scrutiny analysis-indicated by
content restrictions on artistic speech--or even the intermediate scrutiny
analysis for free speech-which the Court would have used if it had
regarded copyright to be a time, place, and manner restriction-the Court
reasoned that copyright doctrines of fair use and idea-expression
dichotomy were by themselves sufficient to protect free speech interests. °5
This left unexplored relevant First Amendment factors. This mode of
analysis separates rather than contextualizes a case that raises underlying
values of speech and implicates more than one constitutional clause.
The reasoning in Golan was based on the Court's earlier decision in
Eldred v. Ashcrofi, which had upheld the constitutionality of the Copyright
Term Extension Act's (CTEA) twenty-year retroactive extension of
copyrighted works that would have otherwise entered the public domain."°6
In Eldred, the petitioner requested the Court to review the Act based on the
Copyright Clause's "limited [t]imes" wording and the First Amendment's
Free Speech Clause. 10 7 Here too, free speech analysis would have likely
involved heightened scrutiny because the regulation of copyright requires
an examination of a work's content; instead, the Supreme Court upheld the
law as a rational exercise of congressional discretion.0 8 The Court did not
even inquire into whether the statute's extension of copyright term to life-
03 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
04 132 S. Ct. 873, 894 (2012).
105 Id. at 890 (recognizing that the idea-expression dichotomy and fair use provisions are "built-in
First Amendment accommodations" (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003))).
1' 537 U.S. at 193-94.
107 Id. at 193.
'0' Id. at 204.
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plus-seventy-years (up from the former life-plus-fifty-years) was a form of
content regulation, which should have implicated First Amendment
doctrine. In the absence of that inquiry, requiring a balancing of interests
and consideration of regulatory alternatives, Eldred's rationale was
incomplete. Because the case dealt with new statutory restrictions on the
dissemination of expression,"°9 the Court should have evaluated whether the
statute restricted speech covered by the First Amendment. In this
evaluation, the Court should have considered: whether the restriction was a
historically countenanced limitation; whether any social goods accounted
for the CTEA; whether the law fit the public end sought; and whether any
less restrictive means could have achieved the desired end. Such holistic
balancing would have recognized that speech is a penumbral value
requiring multifactoral, rather than mono-focused, constitutional analysis.
III. ROBERTS COURT FORMALISM
My multifactoral model, calling for a consistent case-by-case
balancing of free speech concerns against other constitutional values, runs
counter to a recent formalistic turn of free speech jurisprudence. The trend
was set in an opinion striking, in its entirety, 18 U.S.C. § 48, the Depiction
of Animal Cruelty Act, which had criminalized "the commercial creation,
sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty." 110 Congress
passed the federal statute because of the difficulty establishing personal
jurisdiction in state courts and determining the applicable statutes of
limitations since the locations of video recordings were often
unknowable."' In United States v. Stevens, Chief Justice Roberts
vehemently rejected "ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and
benefits.""' 2  Chief Justice Roberts then held the statute to be
unconstitutional without any reflection on counter-factors, weighing on the
side of regulation, because he found that violent declamations were not
109 The Golan Court recognized that copyright law places "some restriction on expression." 132 S.
Ct. at 889.
110 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 464, 482 (2010). The Court held that the statute was
"substantially overbroad," but limited its decision, noting that it did not need to determine "whether a
statute limited to crush videos or other depictions of extreme animal cruelty would be constitutional."
Id. at 482. In fact, Congress responded by passing the Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010-a
revised, narrower version of 18 U.S.C. § 48-which made it illegal to create or distribute "animal crush
videos," videos that depict the suffocation, drowning, or infliction of injuries to non-human animals.
Pub. L. No. 111-294, § 48, 124 Stat. 3177, 3178 (2010).
1 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 492 (Alito, J., dissenting).
112 Id. at 470 (majority opinion).
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among the historically and traditionally recognized categories of
unprotected speech." 3
Justice Alito, the lone dissenter in the case, was significantly more
nuanced in his analysis of relevant legal factors, pointing out that the
videos were the product of conduct that was illegal in all fifty states.' 4
Accordingly, he believed the First Amendment did not cover videos of
criminal conduct: "The Court strikes down in its entirety a valuable
statute... that was enacted not to suppress speech, but to prevent horrific
acts of animal cruelty-in particular, the creation and commercial
exploitation of 'crush videos,' a form of depraved entertainment that has no
social value.""' 5 In balancing the personal interest of those who engaged in
criminal conduct to create videos for consumers wanting to watch them
against the social value of protecting defenseless animals and expressing
public disapproval of animal cruelty through the criminal law, Justice Alito
opted for the latter. The majority, on the other hand, oversimplified free
speech analysis by setting out unprotected categories, narrowly classifying
crush videos, rejecting the need to reflect on social concerns of statutory
policy, and ignoring the fit between that policy and the means used to
achieve it.
The Court next relied on its formalistic, categorical approach in Brown
v. Entertainment Merchants Ass 'n, which struck down a state statute that
prohibited the sale or rental of violent video games to minors."6 As with
Stevens, a majority found visual depictions of violence, even when
obtained by youths, to not be among the categories of speech historically
excluded from First Amendment protections." 7 Instead of balancing the
social interest in protecting children against the right to acquire and market
expressive materials with violent content and considering less restrictive
alternatives, the majority simply listed off categories of low-value speech,
including defamation, fraud, obscenity, incitement, and fighting words." 8
Its rigid paradigm led the majority to the conclusion that the statute at bar
targeted speech that was not among the "well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of' per se unprotected speech."9 Because the law was content-
specific, the strict scrutiny standard applied, and the state failed to meet its
"3 Id. at 469.
114 Id. at 491 (Alito, J. dissenting) (citing HR. PEP. No. 106-397, at 3 (1999)).
"1 Id. at 482 (citation omitted).
116 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2741-42 (2011).
117 See id. at 2733-34; Stevens, 559 U.S. at 469.
118 Entm'tMerchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. at 2733.
119 Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942)).
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burden to show the law was warranted by a compelling state interest.120 The
categorical approach became further entrenched in United States v. Alvarez,
where the plurality adopted the Stevens model of the First Amendment to
find the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 to be unconstitutional. 2
While in these three landmark cases the Justices were justified to resist
arbitrary balancing, none of the lead opinions considered the multifactoral
permeation of judicial deliberation. Nor did they attempt to parse the cases
in light of the private and public interests involved. Fixation on First
Amendment doctrine-rather than sophisticated analysis of facts, a real
canvassing of history, pertinent values, and fit-led to reliance on past
jurisprudence with inadequate reflection on other factors at play. For
example, in Entertainment Merchants it was no doubt proper to look at
historical categories of speech, but the Court latched onto the content
neutral doctrine, giving insufficient weight to the centuries-old tradition of
placing greater limitations on youths than adults. The Court is also
dismissive about the state's parens patriae power and children's alternative
means of obtaining the video games with their parents' permissions.122 The
Stevens Court also should have provided a more transparent rationale; this
was especially the case with the historical method the majority championed
without bothering to discuss policies punishing cruelty to animals nor
engage in any serious historiography. 123 How the Court would have come
down in these cases had it engaged in relevant balancing we cannot know,
but the American people deserved a careful assessment of the legislative
values they regarded to be important rather than the sole reliance on rigid
judicial construction of free speech doctrine.
IV. MULTIFACTORAL NEEDS TODAY
Multifactoral balancing is relevant across the free speech landscape,
even, as we saw, in areas of law typically not analyzed through First
Amendment scrutiny, such as copyright law, criminal conspiracy, and
voting. This Part of the Article demonstrates how the proposed balancing
120 Id. at 2738.
121 See supra text accompanying notes 80-85.
122 The Court only makes a passing allusion to that state power. See Entm't Merchs. Ass', 131 S.
Ct. at 2736 ("No doubt a State possesses legitimate power to protect children from harm, but that does
not include a free-floating power to restrict the ideas to which children may be exposed." (citations
omitted)).
123 For a historical background on animal anti-cruelty laws, see Joseph G. Sauder, Enacting and
Enforcing Felony Animal Cruelty Laws to Prevent Violence Against Humans, 6 ANIMAL L. 1, 3-6
(2000); Benjamin Adams & Jean Larson, Legislative History of the Animal Welfare Act: Introduction,
U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., http://awic.nal.usda.gov/legislative-history-animal-welfare-act/intro
[http://perma.cc/9NDJ-Q3E5].
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test applies to two timely issues. The test is applicable to many more topics,
such as restrictions on commercial and political signs 124 or vanity license
plates,125 but because of prearranged space constraints, I must limit myself
to only two examples. The Court has increasingly used a stilted
understanding of campaign financing and commercial speech, basing its
conclusions on a narrow set of First Amendment concerns instead of giving
adequate consideration to all substantive issues they raise.
A. Campaign Financing
In recent years, the Court has chipped away at Congress's power to
pass campaign finance legislation. 126 In Citizens United v. FEC, the Court
relied on a rigid conception of the First Amendment rather than adopting an
interpretation that would have required the Justices to engage in "case-by-
case determinations" about whether corporations have the same political
speech rights as natural persons.2 7 The majority opinion, penned by Justice
Kennedy, found section 441b of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
(BCRA), which prohibited the use of corporate funds for express advocacy,
to be facially unconstitutional. 128 Rather than carefully scrutinizing whether
the status of corporate entities should be treated the same as citizen voters,
the Court fixed its attention on the category of campaign speech, rejecting
the distinctions between corporate and natural persons. 29 Justice Kennedy
provided neither a systematic study of campaigning in a representative
democracy nor a close comparison and contrast between natural people and
corporations, and he discounted bipartisan government explanations.
Nothing in Justice Kennedy's opinion hinted at the glaring and
pertinent factor that corporations enjoy no right to participate in general
elections. 3 ° His presumption of a debate-centered model of speech placed
124 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
125 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
126 For a debate about how much Citizens United affected an increase in campaign expenditures,
see Richard L. Hasen, Three Wrong Progressive Approaches (and One Right One) to Campaign
Finance Reform, 8 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 21, 21 (2014); Matt Bai, How Did Political Money Get This
Loud?, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY MAG., July 22, 2012, at MM14; Rick Hasen, What Matt Bai's Missing in
His Analysis of Whether Citizens United Is Responsible for the Big Money Explosion, ELECTION L.
BLOG (Jul. 18, 2012, 10:41 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=37108 [http://perma.cc/QL44-RVUU];
Richard L. Hasen, The Numbers Don't Lie: If You Aren't Sure Citizens United Gave Rise to the Super
PACs, Just Follow the Money, SLATE (Mar. 9, 2012, 2:56 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and
_politics/politics/2012/03/thesupremecourt s citizensuniteddecision has led to an explosionof
_campaignspending_.html [https://perma.cc/DXP7-VSUB].
127 558 U.S. 310, 329, 343 (2010).
128 Id. at 365.
129 Id. at 343.
130 Nor do for-profit corporations even have a potential franchise right, as do children. Neither are
1042
Multifactoral Speech
the acquisition and dissemination of information at the center of the
holding's rationale.' 3' And, no doubt, concerns for the dissemination of
ideas were critical to the resolution of the case, but the majority failed to
give due weight to self-government factors, including the different
franchise statuses of individuals and incorporated entities. Even
communicative associations, like Citizens United, lack voting rights, which
for natural people are intrinsic to political expressiveness, but the Court
refused to differentiate First Amendment rights on the basis of the
speakers' identities. Instead of giving any weight to fundamental concerns
of self-government, the Court simply resorted to strict scrutiny analysis, 132
finding no compelling reason to prevent corporations and unions from
funding campaigns,'33 but not subjecting the legislation to more systematic
constitutional evaluation. The value of speech to audiences, to which the
Citizens United majority gave the greatest weight, made too little of the
manipulation of communication markets. 34 Corporations often manipulate
communication markets not to inform, but to nudge consumers' opinions
by drowning out the voices of ordinary citizens who lack the resources to
produce movies and run advertisements."'
In this regard, the very structure of democratic government, in which
natural people can vote and artificial business entities cannot, should be a
weighty consideration for determining whether Congress can use its
Necessary and Proper Clause authority to prevent corporate campaign
corruption or the appearance of corruption.'36 Rather than addressing only
the issue of speech, the Court should have considered Congress's broader
authority. An earlier decision, Buckley v. Valeo, recognized that Congress
can pass campaign financing laws, thereby "legislating for the 'general
welfare'-to reduce the deleterious influence of large contributions on our
political process, to facilitate communication by candidates with the
electorate, and to free candidates from the rigors of fundraising."'37
they incorporated for the express purpose of affecting politics, such as the American Civil Liberties
Union or the American Center for Law and Justice.
'' See Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 at 339.
132 Id. at 340.
133 Id. at 339 ("The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach
consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.").
13'4 See Tamara R. Piety, Why Personhood Matters, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 361, 379-80 (2015).
135 See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L.
REV. 995, 1062 (1998) (arguing that unregulated corporate lobbying for corporate privilege "distorts the
political process by creating a self-reinforcing cycle: the more a corporation is permitted to modify the
law to allow it to profit-maximize at the expense of others, the more money it will have with which to
pursue more such modifications").
136 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45, 90 (1976) (per curiam).
131 Id. at 91.
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Regarded in this way, Congress passes campaign finance laws "not to
abridge, restrict, or censor speech" but "to facilitate and enlarge public
discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a self-
governing people," thereby advancing First Amendment values.13 8
In Citizens United, the issue was not simply the dissemination and
acquisition of information. The majority overturned an earlier Supreme
Court holding that demonstrated great depth to find Congress had a
compelling reason to prevent "the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form."i ' 39 To the contrary, the Citizens United majority found that
the government could not withstand strict scrutiny review of the "outright
ban on corporate political speech during the critical preelection period."'140
Justice Kennedy's decision in Citizens United was formalistic, giving
inadequate deference to the extensive congressional findings that corporate
expenditures from general treasury funds harm eligible voters' abilities to
influence the political process. 141 It would, after all, be impossible for
ordinary citizens to match the political spending of multi-million and even
multi-billion dollar corporations. The immense expenditures on airwaves,
Internet, and television can muffle the political speech of ordinary voters.
The Court adopted a simplistic equivocation between eligible voters and
artificial corporations, without giving adequate weight to how campaign
finance laws empower natural voters during the course of a political
campaign. With the enormous pace of corporate spending algorithmically
outrunning what all but a fraction of the richest voters can expend to be
heard on the airwaves and Internet, Congress had a compelling reason to
place limitations on the use of general corporate funds for advancing free
speech factors associated with representative democracy.
A more unlikely claim to make would be that when an incorporated
business is spending general treasury funds to advocate for the candidate of
its choice, it is engaging in commercial speech, subject to intermediate
rather than strict scrutiny.142 Corporate officers would violate fiduciary duty
138 Id. at 92-93.
131 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 660 (1990)).
140 Id. at 340, 361.
141 See id. at 400 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Congress crafted BCRA
in response to a virtual mountain of research on the corruption that previous legislation had failed to
avert.").
142 Cf Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) (asserting that in
cases where commercial and noncommercial speech are "inextricably intertwined... what level of
scrutiny to apply to a compelled statement must be the nature of the speech taken as a whole and the
effect of the compelled statement thereon").
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obligations by supporting political causes averse to business profits. The
commercialization of political speech argument is unlikely to sway the
current Court, which is increasingly leaning in favor of equalizing
commercial and ordinary speech. 43 Indeed, company reputation is likely to
benefit by supporting some political causes. Moreover, it is unpredictable
whether the combination of political and commercial factors would receive
compelling or intermediate scrutiny. The inquiry would need to focus on
the primary impetus of the message, whether it was commercial or
political.
The better method for elective franchise is to treat corporations as
commercial entities, not possessing identical protections as persons eligible
to cast ballots, and to treat their campaign speech as advertisements
supporting candidates from whom they expect to curry favor for their for-
profit interests. 144 This suggestion would evaluate the importance of
regulations, their scope for addressing corporate advertisement issues, the
effects of the speech and regulation on voting, alternative methods, and the
fit between means and ends.
The reverse position, which requires courts to determine whether
campaign financing restrictions were required to achieve a compelling
public aim in the least restrictive way possible, allows for all manner of
obfuscation. Such an end-around would render "political speech" a catchall
for avoiding legitimate regulation.1 41 It would be easy enough in
advertisements to add visual depictions of a small national flag icon, a
political party emblem, or a political candidate's photograph, and then for
the corporation to claim strict scrutiny protection because the ad had mixed
political and commercial aims.
The BCRA did not altogether prevent corporations from engaging in
political speech but required that political advocacy be conducted from
funds separate from the general treasury. 146  Under this scheme,
shareholders and corporate officers were permitted to contribute money to
143 See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
144 See Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension
Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 383
(2015) ("Under conservative corporate theory, the only legitimate reason for a for-profit corporation to
make political expenditures will be to elect or defeat candidates based on their support for policies that
the corporation believes will produce the most profits.").
145 A recent empirical study demonstrates the increased frequency of free speech litigation filed to
"benefit business corporations and trade groups, rather than other kinds of organizations or individuals."
John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & the First Amendment: History, Data, and Implications,
30 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 224 (2015).
146 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337-39 (finding the PAC exemption from § 441b was
inadequate to save the statute from First Amendment scrutiny).
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political action committees (PACs) in order to express their political
views. 147 But the amount then available for the business to engage in
political advocacy was only a fraction of its general budget. 48
Isolating speech concerns from the many components of self-
government-personal and public-that should go into reviews of
campaign finance regulations have diminished federal power to address
political corruption and preferential treatment. The most recent casualty of
free speech exclusivity has been the BCRA's cumulative aggregation limit,
which the Court ruled to be unconstitutional in McCutcheon v. FEC.149 The
statute contained limits on the total amount of money a donor could
contribute to all candidates and to political action committees.5 ° The
legislation was meant to curb the potentially corrupting influence affluent
contributors could wield on politicians, enabling them to curry special
favors for pet projects in exchange for massive donations.'' The plurality
held to a narrow view of political corruption, only recognizing the
constitutionality of regulations specifically targeting quid pro quo
contributions in return for something specific in return.5
The McCutcheon plurality found unconstitutional congressional limits
on the total aggregate amount an individual can contribute to all federal
political campaigns."' The BCRA already set a high monetary limit: a
person could contribute up to $123,200 each election cycle.15 4 Even though
the Court left untouched the monetary cap on the amount contributors
could give each federal candidate,'55 the unhinging of total aggregate
contributions is likely to have far-reaching consequences. Wealthy
individuals are now able to use even more money to curry favor with
politicians.
The McCutcheon plurality went even further in expanding the ability
of wealthy parties to invest in candidates by narrowing the definition of the
form of corruption that was sufficiently compelling for Congress to
regulate to "only a specific type of corruption-'quid pro quo'
corruption."'56 The decision greatly augments contributors' abilities to
147 Id. at 321.
148 See id.
149 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014) (plurality opinion).
1 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3) (2012) (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(3) (2014)).
'.' McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442 (plurality opinion).
152 Id. at 1450.
1'3 Id. at 1442.
1'4 Id. at 1443.
... Id. at 1442.
156 Id. at 1450.
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advance their speech interests. Not adequately factored into the plurality's
opinion, however, is the erosion in the ability of indigent and middle class
citizens, who lack the means or interest, to make multi-candidate campaign
contributions to influence elections and policies. Money provides donors
with greater access to politicians and helps them solicit politicians for
special favors. When money calls the political shots, the voices of ordinary
people are muffled. People with less access to politicians have less
influence on public actions. Persons able to reach such a high aggregate
contribution limit have greater access to politicians than the average voter.
They are thereby able to skew the marketplace of ideas. The readiness with
which money can impact decisionmaking, even absent any bribery or quid
pro quo agreements, has serious implications for the search for truth, the
exercise of representative democracy, and the enjoyment of political
equality.
While it is impossible for everyone to have identical access to
politicians, legislation should be analyzed through rigorous multifactoral
analysis. Although aggregate contributions do not directly affect
individuals' voting rights, they make it more difficult for ordinary citizens
living throughout the United States to be heard in the halls of power, the
media, and public squares."' Citizenship and the guarantee of republican
government include the ability to live in various states and be treated as
political equals. 5 ' Meaningful participation is an indispensable part of
citizenship, including the ability to support candidates and sway the
electorate.
Political communications sway the public and help to influence
elections-what other reasons would candidates have for high volume
advertising, speechifying, and door-to-door stumping-and legitimate
limits can be made to preserve the personal right of each voter to be an
equal in the elective process. Rather than categorizing campaign
contributions to be the principal value at stake, in McCutcheon, the Court
should have evaluated whether statutory aggregation limits were narrowly
designed to meet general, political, and expressive welfare; how close a fit
the scheme was to that goal; whether equal representative governance
157 See Dollars and Sense: How Undisclosed Money and Post-McCutcheon Campaign Finance
Will Affect the 2014 Election and Beyond: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Rules and Admin., 113th
Cong. 476-91 (2014) (statement of Liz Kennedy, Counsel, Demos); Robert Reich, The Most Brazen
Invitation to Oligarchy in Supreme Court History, BERKELEY BLOG: POL. & L. (Apr. 2, 2014),
http ://blogs.berkeley.edu/2014/04/02/robert-reich-the-most-brazen-invitation-to-oligarchy-in-supreme-
court-history/comment-page-l/ [http://perma.cc/UFU4-CC66).
158 See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 77 (1980) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he Equal Protection
Clause confers a substantive right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other qualified
voters.").
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offered competing, systemic, electoral interests that were of countervailing
importance; and whether it was possible to achieve that end with a more
narrow piece of legislation, such as one only barring quid pro quo
contributions.
Justice Breyer, writing for the dissent, asserted a broader perspective
on campaign financing reforms and their emanation from the First
Amendment. Corruption, he explained, was anything that "cuts the link
between political thought and political action."'59 Rather than picking and
choosing from various strands of past Supreme Court cases, in the manner
of the plurality, the dissent averred to the broad interest of ending any form
of corruption against "the integrity of our public governmental
institutions."'6 ° This is a far more multidimensional framework than the
plurality's. The dissent relied on a balancing test along the lines proposed
in Part II of this Article. Justice Breyer demonstrated historical, structural,
and normative concerns about corruption and the appearance of corruption,
which "are more than ordinary factors to be weighed against the
constitutional right to political speech."''
Justice Breyer's dissent might have been even more robust had he
examined the diffuse, penumbral principle against corruption, which
strengthens a variety of other constitutional values-such as fairness,
equality, administration of law, republicanism, and departmental
responsibility-which factor into the structure of the Constitution.
Campaign finance laws are tied to the government's duty to preserve
electoral integrity, 16 2 which is intrinsic to representative democracy. 163
Reasonable limits on aggregate contributions can advance effective
participation in democracy by safeguarding the people's ability to engage
in free political discussions and inform the government of their
preferences. 164 Aggregation limits on total contributions to all candidates
and action committees were designed to preserve the people's "opportunity
for free political discussion,' 165 which is constitutionally essential for the
multifactoral role of free speech in a republic of civic equals. Maintaining
parity in the ability of people to influence politicians and fellow citizens
"' McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
160 id.
161 Id. at 1468.
162 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (discussing the government's obligation to
ensure "one person, one vote" (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963))).
163 See ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED 86-87 (2014).
164 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (asserting that
free speech is essential to democracy).
165 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
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advances the personal right to engage in public deliberations and the
public's right to hold politicians accountable for the general welfare.
B. Commercial Speech
With the brief space I have remaining, I wish to demonstrate the
applicability of the multifactoral approach to a different aspect of
communication than political information: transactional commercial
speech. I only briefly sketch the argument here and will return to it in
future scholarship.
We have already seen in the context of campaign finance that the
Court relies on intermediate scrutiny to analyze the constitutionality of
limitations on commercial speech. l  The Supreme Court established the
commercial speech doctrine forty years ago. 167 That redirection was a
departure from the Court's earlier decision from the World War II era. 168
After 1976, the Court began to apply First Amendment protections to
commercial speech. The Court regarded the decision to apply First
Amendment scrutiny to nonmisleading and legal commercial speech to be
an anti-paternalistic turn that would enable consumers to benefit from the
free exchange of ideas. 69 The four-part intermediate scrutiny test for
evaluating commercial speech cases appeared in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.'7° The test differs from the
more rigorous strict scrutiny standard used in noncommercial content
discrimination cases. 171 Central Hudson requires proof of an important,
rather than a compelling government interest,172 and even though both of
those methods require narrow tailoring, the Court is more deferential in
matters of commercial speech, requiring the regulation to have a
"reasonable" and proportional fit with the government aims.173 Several
subsequent opinions have demonstrated an increasing skepticism about
governmental rationalizations for regulating commercial speech.174
166 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
167 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-70
(1976).
168 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
169 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
170 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
171 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015) (discussing the strict scrutiny
standard for content-based speech).
172 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
17' Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
174 See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373-74 (2002); Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490-91 (1995).
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In its most recent pronouncement in this area, the Court signaled a
willingness to at least consider moving toward a more rigorous test that
would increasingly favor commercial advertisers. In Sorrell v. IMS Health
Inc., data miners and pharmaceutical manufacturers successfully
challenged the constitutionality of a Vermont law prohibiting the
nonconsensual "s[ale], license, or exchange for value" of pharmacy records
to pharmaceutical manufacturers and marketers to be used for the
promotion and marketing of prescription drugs.175 The Court held that the
marketing of such data was a form of free expression protected by a
heightened standard of judicial scrutiny.176 Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, proclaimed the restriction to be based on content and viewpoint
biases against those who promote brand name drugs.'77
Like so many cases in the free speech field, Sorrell is filled with
discussions of judicially created doctrines with short shrift given to any
other constitutional factors. From the outside, it simply looks as if the
Court picks and chooses precedents to justify its conclusion with little
effort made to reflect on the multiple factors, besides the dissemination of
information, involved in pharmaceutical companies' purchasing of private
information to increase profits, improve products, and deliver a publicly
beneficial service. There is no talk, for instance, of relying on federalism
analysis to parse statutory reasoning and no credence given to the
possibility that the people, through their representatives, might have used
state legislative means to manage the balance between privacy and
scientific advancement. While the Court speaks fervently against legislative
overreaching, it consolidates its institutional power and stifles state efforts
to represent the interests of the people through commercial regulation: it
alone is the interpreter of the Constitution, empowered to strike state efforts
to protect residents against cynical commercial efforts to manipulate
physicians' prescription decisions. The majority wields the power of
creating free speech doctrine, dismissively giving inadequate attention to
the states' powers to regulate manipulative advertisement, public health,
and private data.
CONCLUSION
Free speech is an indispensable right of representative democracy. It is
essential for furthering self-government, individual autonomy, and the
marketplace of ideas. Put more succinctly, the First Amendment protects
7 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659-61 (2011).
176 Id. at 2659.
... Id. at 2663.
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the liberty rights of persons to express themselves as equals for the
common, social benefit. However, it is not a value that stands alone and
certainly not a norm that should be opportunistically harnessed in
conformance to ideological judicial leanings. Cases testing the regulation
of speech should more thoroughly balance competing values to determine
the relevant factors for treating seriously the interests of litigants and public
policies.
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